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UK	governance	after	Brexit:	yet	more	variable	and
even	more	disjointed
Michael	Kenny	and	Jack	Sheldon	write	that,	although	May’s	government	has	been
prepared	to	make	various	concessions	in	its	dealings	with	the	devolved	governments,
tricky	intergovernmental	negotiations	relating	to	Brexit	are	in	line.	How	these	will	be
managed	will	be	one	of	the	most	difficult	aspects	of	the	Brexit	process.
Cabinet	Office	minister	David	Lidington	recently	delivered	(to	little	fanfare)	one	of	the	most
significant	speeches	made	by	any	UK	minister	about	the	UK’s	future	after	Brexit.	He	set
out	how	Theresa	May’s	government	will	approach	the	thorny	question	of	powers	returned	from	the	EU	which	fall
within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	devolved	governments	in	Scotland,	Wales,	and	Northern	Ireland,	including	those	relating
to	farming,	fishing,	and	the	environment.	He	maintained	that	the	approach	he	proposed	would	allow	the	issue	to	be
dealt	with	equitably,	and	expressed	the	government’s	dual	commitments	to	the	devolution	settlement	and	the
integrity	of	the	United	Kingdom.
The	speech	also	included	a	low-key,	but	notable,	shift	in	policy	as	he	revealed	that	the	government	would	work	on
the	presumption	that	devolved	powers	should	remain	devolved	once	Brexit	happens	(rather	than	being	held	initially
by	the	UK	government).	He	stressed	too	the	importance	of	protecting	the	internal	‘common	market’	as	he
simultaneously	made	the	case	for	the	establishment	of	UK-wide	frameworks	in	areas	such	as	package	labelling	and
hygiene	rules.	These	should	initially	be	overseen	by	Whitehall	in	order	to	ensure	that	problematic	kinds	of	regulatory
divergence	do	not	ensue.
Having	already	drastically	reduced	the	list	of	issues	where	legislative	frameworks	of	this	kind	would	be	required,	and
having	offered	this	new	concession	in	his	speech,	Lidington	hoped	he	had	done	enough	to	assuage	the	concerns	of
Cardiff	and	Edinburgh	that	Brexit	might	entail	some	kind	of	resiling	on	devolution	and	a	reassertion	of	authority	by	the
centre.
He	was	quickly	disappointed.	The	first	ministers	of	Scotland	and	Wales	roundly	rejected	his	offer	and,	acting	with	a
striking	degree	of	synchronicity,	unveiled	the	next	day	emergency	‘continuity	bills’	designed	to	ensure	that	these
contentious	powers	would	pass	straight	to	Edinburgh	and	Cardiff.	This	move	raises	the	possibility	of	legislation	being
passed	that	conflicts	with	the	UK	government’s	Withdrawal	Bill.
As	so	often	with	Britain’s	territorial	politics,	what	appears	like	a	rather	technical,	second-order	set	of	questions	in
London,	has	profound	symbolic	resonance	for	countries	whose	constitutional	position	within	the	UK	has	been
evolving	rather	unpredictably,	and	which	are	led	by	political	parties	deeply	opposed	to	the	policies	of	the	May
administration.
LSE Brexit: UK governance after Brexit: yet more variable and even more disjointed Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-04-09
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/04/09/uk-governance-after-brexit-yet-more-variable-and-even-more-disjointed/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Featured	image
credit:	Pixabay/Public	Domain.
The	dispute	over	Clause	11	of	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill
The	UK’s	continued	membership	of	the	EU	was	baked	into	the	statutes	which	introduced	devolution	in	the	late
1990s.	But	now	that	Britain	is	trying	to	leave	this	wider	union,	some	very	difficult	questions	–		to	which	there	are	no
clear	constitutional	or	legal	answers	–	are	bubbling	to	the	surface.	Clause	11	of	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill
is	the	arena	where	these	tensions	are	being	played	out.	Its	original	draft	would	have	prevented	the	devolved
administrations	from	legislating	in	all	areas	currently	covered	by	EU	law	until	the	long-term	allocation	of	powers	was
agreed.	But	this	idea	was	always	contested	in	Edinburgh	and	Cardiff,	which	have	held	responsibilities	for	areas	such
as	agriculture	and	fisheries	since	devolution,	although	both	have	been	required	to	act	within	the	constraints	of	EU
law.
The	gap	between	the	UK	government	and	its	counterparts	is	currently	fairly	narrow	but	still	wide	enough	to	allow
politicians	in	Wales	and	Scotland	to	present	themselves	as	the	defenders	of	the	national	interest	against	the	tyranny
of	London.	Both	governments	have	agreed	to	the	principle	of	establishing	UK-wide	‘common	frameworks’	in	key
areas.	For	their	part,	UK	ministers	have	repeatedly	committed	to	the	idea	of	some	EU	powers	being	exercised
exclusively	at	devolved	level	after	Brexit,	and	have	now	backed	away	from	placing	a	reservation	on	‘retained	EU
law’.
The	main	area	of	disagreement	that	remains	relates	to	Lidington’s	argument	for	the	UK	government	to	be	‘involved’
in	areas	where	frameworks	are	proposed	while	these	are	negotiated,	in	order	to	‘protect	the	UK	common	market	or	to
meet	our	international	obligations’.	The	exact	nature	of	this	involvement	and	how	(if	at	all)	it	will	be	provided	for	in	the
Withdrawal	Bill	was	not	specified.	A	deal	may	yet	be	achievable,	but	with	the	bill	currently	at	committee	stage	in	the
House	of	Lords,	time	is	running	out.
In	the	scenario	that	no	deal	is	reached,	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	governments	would	seek	to	pass	their	‘continuity
bills’.	These	seek	to	incorporate	EU	law	into	devolved	law,	meaning	that	if	it	pressed	ahead	with	enacting	its
Withdrawal	Bill	without	the	consent	of	the	parliaments	of	Scotland	and	Wales,	the	UK	government	would	be	tearing
up	one	of	the	core	conventions	of	the	devolution	settlement	and	entering	unchartered	constitutional	waters.	Such	a
move	might	precipitate	a	new	demand	for	an	independence	referendum	in	Scotland.
Beyond	Clause	11
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With	this	in	mind,	May’s	government	has	been	prepared	to	make	various	concessions	in	its	dealings	with	the
devolved	governments.	Getting	beyond	the	current	dispute	over	Clause	11	matters	a	great	deal	because	further,
tricky	intergovernmental	negotiations	relating	to	Brexit	will	soon	be	coming	down	the	line.	Even	if	the	process	for
deciding	on	these	new	frameworks	is	agreed,	fleshing	them	out	will	plunge	these	parties	into	complex	questions	of
policy,	with	real	differences	of	interest	and	perspective	over,	for	instance,	the	needs	of	farmers	in	different	parts	of
the	UK,	to	the	fore.	Given	the	different	political	compositions	and	policy	priorities	of	each	government,	this	will	be	an
immensely	challenging	process.
If	Theresa	May	wants	to	avoid	a	high	stakes	battle	over	whether	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	parliaments	will	provide
legislative	consent	for	the	bill	implementing	the	final	Brexit	deal,	further	concessions	over	substance	and	procedure
are	likely.	And	as	these	come	to	pass,	the	governance	of	the	UK	will	become	yet	more	variable,	and	its	internal
territorial	constitution	even	more	disjointed.	No	wonder	that	those	on	the	right	who	have	perhaps	never	reconciled
fully	to	devolution	are	starting	to	make	their	voices	heard	once	more.
Managing	the	challenges	and	conflicts	arising	from	the	UK’s	territorial	governance	will	be	one	of	the	most	difficult	and
important	aspects	of	Brexit,	and	may	have	important	long-term	implications	for	the	wider	territorial	constitution.	As
one	of	the	research	teams	contributing	to	the	Between	Two	Unions	project,	funded	by	the	ESRC,	we	are	seeking	to
understand	these	developments	as	they	happen,	and	exploring	the	changing	ways	in	which	the	UK	government	and
the	devolved	administrations	are	engaging	with	each	other.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	was	originally
published	on	the	Cambridge	Institute	for	Public	Policy’s	blog	and	the	BPP.	Further	interim	outputs	will	be	published
on	the	project’s	blog	in	the	coming	months,	and	you	can	read	more	about	the	wider	project	here.
Michael	Kenny	is	Professor	of	Public	Policy	at	the	University	of	Cambridge	and	the	inaugural	Director	of	the
Cambridge	Institute	for	Public	Policy.
Jack	Sheldon	is	a	Research	Assistant	at	the	Cambridge	Institute	for	Public	Policy,	working	on	the	Between	Two
Unions	project.
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